Item type |
学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) |
公開日 |
2019-01-17 |
タイトル |
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言語 |
en |
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タイトル |
Asymmetric Leakage from Multiplier and Collision-Based Single-Shot Side-Channel Attack |
言語 |
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言語 |
eng |
キーワード |
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言語 |
en |
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主題 |
RSA |
キーワード |
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言語 |
en |
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主題 |
side-channel attack |
キーワード |
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言語 |
en |
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主題 |
collision attack |
キーワード |
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言語 |
en |
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主題 |
Montgomery multiplication |
資源タイプ |
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資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
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資源タイプ |
journal article |
著者 |
SUGAWARA, Takeshi
SUZUKI, Daisuke
SAEKI, Minoru
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抄録 |
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内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
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内容記述 |
The single-shot collision attack on RSA proposed by Hanley et al. is studied focusing on the difference between two operands of multiplier. It is shown that how leakage from integer multiplier and long-integer multiplication algorithm can be asymmetric between two operands. The asymmetric leakage is verified with experiments on FPGA and micro-controller platforms. Moreover, we show an experimental result in which success and failure of the attack is determined by the order of operands. Therefore, designing operand order can be a cost-effective countermeasure. Meanwhile we also show a case in which a particular countermeasure becomes ineffective when the asymmetric leakage is considered. In addition to the above main contribution, an extension of the attack by Hanley et al. using the signal-processing technique of Big Mac Attack is presented. |
書誌情報 |
en : IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
巻 E99.A,
号 7,
p. 1323-1333,
発行日 2016-07-01
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出版者 |
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出版者 |
IEICE |
ISSN |
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収録物識別子タイプ |
ISSN |
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収録物識別子 |
0916-8508 |
DOI |
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関連タイプ |
isIdenticalTo |
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識別子タイプ |
DOI |
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関連識別子 |
10.1587/transfun.E99.A.1323 |
権利 |
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権利情報 |
copyright©2016 IEICE |
関連サイト |
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識別子タイプ |
URI |
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関連識別子 |
http://search.ieice.org/index.html |
著者版フラグ |
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出版タイプ |
VoR |
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出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |